Privilege Escalation: Impersonation Role Granted for Dormant Service Account
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This document describes a threat finding type in Security Command Center. Threat findings are generated by
threat detectors when they detect
a potential threat in your cloud resources. For a full list of available threat findings, see Threat findings index.
Overview
An impersonation role was granted to a principal that allows
that principal to impersonate a dormant user-managed service
account. In this finding, the dormant service account is the affected
resource, and a service account is considered dormant if it has
been inactive for more than 180 days.
How to respond
To respond to this finding, do the following:
Step 1: Review finding details
Open the Privilege Escalation: Impersonation Role Granted for Dormant Service Account
finding, as directed in Reviewing findings.
In the finding details, on the Summary tab, note the values of
following fields.
Under What was detected:
Principal email: the user who conducted the granting action
Offending access grants.Principal name: the principal who was granted the impersonation role
Under Affected resource:
Resource display name: the dormant service account as a resource
Project full name: the project where that dormant service account resides
Contact the owner of the Principal email field.
Confirm whether the legitimate owner conducted the action.
Step 3: Check logs
On the Summary tab of the finding details panel, under the Related links
click the Cloud Logging URI link to open the Logs Explorer.
Step 4: Implement your response
The following response plan might be appropriate for this finding, but might also impact operations.
Carefully evaluate the information you gather in your investigation to determine the best way to
resolve findings.
Contact the owner of the project where the action was taken.
Remove the access of the owner of the Principal email if it is compromised.
Remove the newly granted impersonation role from the target member.
Consider deleting the potentially compromised service account and rotate and delete
all service account access keys for the potentially compromised project. After
deletion, applications that use the service account for authentication lose
access. Before proceeding, your security team should identify all impacted
applications and work with application owners to ensure business continuity.
Work with your security team to identify unfamiliar resources, including
Compute Engine instances, snapshots, service accounts, and IAM
users. Delete resources not created with authorized accounts.
Respond to any notifications from Cloud Customer Care.
[[["Easy to understand","easyToUnderstand","thumb-up"],["Solved my problem","solvedMyProblem","thumb-up"],["Other","otherUp","thumb-up"]],[["Hard to understand","hardToUnderstand","thumb-down"],["Incorrect information or sample code","incorrectInformationOrSampleCode","thumb-down"],["Missing the information/samples I need","missingTheInformationSamplesINeed","thumb-down"],["Other","otherDown","thumb-down"]],["Last updated 2025-09-10 UTC."],[],[],null,["| Premium and Enterprise [service tiers](/security-command-center/docs/service-tiers)\n\nThis document describes a threat finding type in Security Command Center. Threat findings are generated by\n[threat detectors](/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources#threats) when they detect\na potential threat in your cloud resources. For a full list of available threat findings, see [Threat findings index](/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index).\n\nOverview\n\nAn impersonation role was granted to a principal that allows\nthat principal to impersonate a dormant [user-managed service\naccount](/iam/docs/service-account-types#user-managed). In this finding, the dormant service account is the affected\nresource, and a service account is considered dormant if it has\nbeen inactive for more than 180 days.\n\nHow to respond\n\nTo respond to this finding, do the following:\n\nStep 1: Review finding details\n\n1. Open the `Privilege Escalation: Impersonation Role Granted for Dormant Service Account` finding, as directed in [Reviewing findings](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats#reviewing_findings).\n2. In the finding details, on the **Summary** tab, note the values of\n following fields.\n\n Under **What was detected**:\n - **Principal email**: the user who conducted the granting action\n - **Offending access grants.Principal name**: the principal who was granted the impersonation role\n\n Under **Affected resource**:\n - **Resource display name**: the dormant service account as a resource\n - **Project full name**: the project where that dormant service account resides\n\nStep 2: Research attack and response methods\n\n1. Use [service account\n tools](/policy-intelligence/docs/service-account-usage-tools), like [Activity\n Analyzer](/policy-intelligence/docs/activity-analyzer-service-account-authentication), to investigate the activity of the dormant service account.\n2. Contact the owner of the **Principal email** field. Confirm whether the legitimate owner conducted the action.\n\nStep 3: Check logs\n\n1. On the **Summary tab** of the finding details panel, under the **Related links** click the **Cloud Logging URI** link to open the **Logs Explorer**.\n\nStep 4: Implement your response\n\n\nThe following response plan might be appropriate for this finding, but might also impact operations.\nCarefully evaluate the information you gather in your investigation to determine the best way to\nresolve findings.\n\n- Contact the owner of the project where the action was taken.\n- Remove the access of the owner of the **Principal email** if it is compromised.\n- Remove the newly granted impersonation role from the target member.\n- Consider [deleting the potentially compromised service account](/iam/docs/service-accounts-delete-undelete#deleting) and rotate and delete all service account access keys for the potentially compromised project. After deletion, applications that use the service account for authentication lose access. Before proceeding, your security team should identify all impacted applications and work with application owners to ensure business continuity.\n- Work with your security team to identify unfamiliar resources, including Compute Engine instances, snapshots, service accounts, and IAM users. Delete resources not created with authorized accounts.\n- Respond to any notifications from Cloud Customer Care.\n- To limit who can create service accounts, use the [Organization Policy Service](/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/overview).\n- To identify and fix overly permissive roles, use [IAM\n recommender](/iam/docs/recommender-overview).\n\nWhat's next\n\n- Learn [how to work with threat\n findings in Security Command Center](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats).\n- Refer to the [Threat findings index](/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index).\n- Learn how to [review a\n finding](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats#reviewing_findings) through the Google Cloud console.\n- Learn about the [services that\n generate threat findings](/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources#threats)."]]