If access to your protected resources isn't managed by Google Cloud's IAM—for example, the resources are stored in another cloud service, on-premises, or on a local device such as a mobile phone—you can still authenticate a Confidential Space workload to the device that provides access to those resources, otherwise known as a relying party.
To do so, the relying party must request an attestation token from the Confidential Space attestation service with a custom audience and optional nonces. When requesting an attestation token like this, you need to perform your own token validation before granting access to resources.
The documentation that follows covers the concepts involved in using Confidential Space with resources outside of Google Cloud. For an end-to-end walkthrough, see the codelab.
Attestation token flow
Attestation tokens are requested by the workload on behalf of a relying party and returned by the attestation service. Depending on your needs, you can define a custom audience and optionally provide nonces.
Unencrypted
For ease of understanding the token retrieval process, the flow presented here doesn't use encryption. In practice, we recommend you encrypt communications with TLS.
The following diagram shows the flow:
The relying party sends a token request to the workload, with optional nonces that it has generated.
The workload determines the audience, adds the audience to the request, and sends the request to the Confidential Space launcher.
The launcher sends the request to the attestation service.
The attestation service generates a token that contains the specified audience and optional nonces.
The attestation service returns the token to the launcher.
The launcher returns the token to the workload.
The workload returns the token to the relying party.
The relying party verifies the claims, including the audience and optional nonces.
Encrypted with TLS
An unencrypted flow leaves the request vulnerable to machine in the middle attacks. Because a nonce isn't bound to the data output or a TLS session, an attacker can intercept the request and impersonate the workload.
To help prevent this type of attack, you can set up a TLS session between the relying party and workload and use the TLS exported key material (EKM) as a nonce. The TLS exported key material binds the attestation to the TLS session and confirms that the attestation request was sent through a secured channel. This process is also known as channel binding.
The following diagram shows the flow using channel binding:
The relying party sets up a secure TLS session with the Confidential VM that is running the workload.
The relying party sends a token request using the secure TLS session.
The workload determines the audience and generates a nonce using the TLS exported key material.
The workload sends the request to the Confidential Space launcher.
The launcher sends the request to the attestation service.
The attestation service generates a token that contains the specified audience and nonce.
The attestation service returns the token to the launcher.
The launcher returns the token to the workload.
The workload returns the token to the relying party.
The relying party re-generates the nonce using the TLS exported key material.
The relying party verifies the claims, including the audience and nonce. The nonce in the token must match the nonce that is regenerated by the relying party.
Attestation token structure
Attestation tokens are JSON web tokens with the following structure:
Header: Describes the signing algorithm. PKI tokens also store the certificate chain in the header in the
x5c
field.Signed JSON data payload: Contains claims about the workload for the relying party, such as subject, issuer, audience, nonces, and expiration time.
Signature: Provides validation that the token hasn't changed during transit. For more information about using the signature, see How to Validate an OpenID Connect ID Token.
The following code sample is an example of an encoded attestation token generated in the Confidential Space 240500 image. Newer images might contain additional fields. You can use https://jwt.io/ to decode it (the signature is redacted).
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjEyMzQ1IiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.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-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-Iiwic2lnbmF0dXJlX2FsZ29yaXRobSI6IlJTQVNTQV9QU1NfU0hBMjU2In0seyJrZXlfaWQiOiI8aGV4YWRlY2ltYWwtc2hhMjU2LWZpbmdlcnByaW50LXB1YmxpYy1rZXkyPiIsInNpZ25hdHVyZSI6IjxiYXNlNjQtZW5jb2RlZC1zaWduYXR1cmU-Iiwic2lnbmF0dXJlX2FsZ29yaXRobSI6IlJTQVNTQV9QU1NfU0hBMjU2In0seyJrZXlfaWQiOiI8aGV4YWRlY2ltYWwtc2hhMjU2LWZpbmdlcnByaW50LXB1YmxpYy1rZXkzPiIsInNpZ25hdHVyZSI6IjxiYXNlNjQtZW5jb2RlZC1zaWduYXR1cmU-Iiwic2lnbmF0dXJlX2FsZ29yaXRobSI6IkVDRFNBX1AyNTZfU0hBMjU2In1dLCJyZXN0YXJ0X3BvbGljeSI6Ik5ldmVyIn0sImdjZSI6eyJpbnN0YW5jZV9pZCI6IklOU1RBTkNFX0lEIiwiaW5zdGFuY2VfbmFtZSI6IklOU1RBTkNFX05BTUUiLCJwcm9qZWN0X2lkIjoiUFJPSkVDVF9JRCIsInByb2plY3RfbnVtYmVyIjoiUFJPSkVDVF9OVU1CRVIiLCJ6b25lIjoidXMtY2VudHJhbDEtYSJ9fSwic3duYW1lIjoiQ09ORklERU5USUFMX1NQQUNFIiwic3d2ZXJzaW9uIjpbIjI0MDUwMCJdfQ.29V71ymnt7LY5Ny6OJFb9AClT4XNLPi0TIcddKDp5pk<SIGNATURE>
Here is the decoded version of the previous sample:
{
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "12345",
"typ": "JWT"
}.
{
"aud": "AUDIENCE_NAME",
"dbgstat": "disabled-since-boot",
"eat_nonce": [
"NONCE_1",
"NONCE_2"
],
"eat_profile": "https://cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims",
"exp": 1721330075,
"google_service_accounts": [
"PROJECT_ID-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com"
],
"hwmodel": "GCP_AMD_SEV",
"iat": 1721326475,
"iss": "https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com",
"nbf": 1721326475,
"oemid": 11129,
"secboot": true,
"sub": "https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/PROJECT_ID/zones/us-central1-a/instances/INSTANCE_NAME",
"submods": {
"confidential_space": {
"monitoring_enabled": {
"memory": false
},
"support_attributes": [
"LATEST",
"STABLE",
"USABLE"
]
},
"container": {
"args": [
"/customnonce",
"/docker-entrypoint.sh",
"nginx",
"-g",
"daemon off;"
],
"env": {
"HOSTNAME": "HOST_NAME",
"NGINX_VERSION": "1.27.0",
"NJS_RELEASE": "2~bookworm",
"NJS_VERSION": "0.8.4",
"PATH": "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
"PKG_RELEASE": "2~bookworm"
},
"image_digest": "sha256:67682bda769fae1ccf5183192b8daf37b64cae99c6c3302650f6f8bf5f0f95df",
"image_id": "sha256:fffffc90d343cbcb01a5032edac86db5998c536cd0a366514121a45c6723765c",
"image_reference": "docker.io/library/nginx:latest",
"image_signatures": [
{
"key_id": "<hexadecimal-sha256-fingerprint-public-key1>",
"signature": "<base64-encoded-signature>",
"signature_algorithm": "RSASSA_PSS_SHA256"
},
{
"key_id": "<hexadecimal-sha256-fingerprint-public-key2>",
"signature": "<base64-encoded-signature>",
"signature_algorithm": "RSASSA_PSS_SHA256"
},
{
"key_id": "<hexadecimal-sha256-fingerprint-public-key3>",
"signature": "<base64-encoded-signature>",
"signature_algorithm": "ECDSA_P256_SHA256"
}
],
"restart_policy": "Never"
},
"gce": {
"instance_id": "INSTANCE_ID",
"instance_name": "INSTANCE_NAME",
"project_id": "PROJECT_ID",
"project_number": "PROJECT_NUMBER",
"zone": "us-central1-a"
}
},
"swname": "CONFIDENTIAL_SPACE",
"swversion": [
"240500"
]
}
For a more detailed explanation of attestation token fields, see Attestation token claims.
Retrieve attestation tokens
Complete the following steps to implement attestation tokens in your Confidential Space environment:
Set up an HTTP client in your workload.
In your workload, use the HTTP client to make an HTTP request to the listening URL,
http://localhost/v1/token
, over a Unix domain socket. The socket file is located at/run/container_launcher/teeserver.sock
.
When a request is made to the listening URL, the Confidential Space launcher manages the attestation evidence collection, requests an attestation token from the attestation service (passing along any custom parameters), and then returns the generated token to the workload.
The following code sample in Go demonstrates how to communicate with the launcher's HTTP server over IPC.
func getCustomTokenBytes(body string) ([]byte, error) {
httpClient := http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
// Set the DialContext field to a function that creates
// a new network connection to a Unix domain socket
DialContext: func(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
return net.Dial("unix", "/run/container_launcher/teeserver.sock")
},
},
}
// Get the token from the IPC endpoint
url := "http://localhost/v1/token"
resp, err := httpClient.Post(url, "application/json", strings.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get raw token response: %w", err)
}
tokenbytes, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read token body: %w", err)
}
fmt.Println(string(tokenbytes))
return tokenbytes, nil
}
Request an attestation token with a custom audience
HTTP method and URL:
POST http://localhost/v1/token
Request JSON body:
{
"audience": "AUDIENCE_NAME",
"token_type": "TOKEN_TYPE",
"nonces": [
"NONCE_1",
"NONCE_2",
...
]
}
Provide the following values:
AUDIENCE_NAME
: Required. Your audience value, which is the name you've given your relying party. This is set by the workload.This field default to
https://sts.google.com
for tokens without a custom audience. The valuehttps://sts.google.com
can't be used when setting a custom audience. The maximum length is 512 bytes.To include a custom audience in a token, the workload—not the relying party—must add it to the attestation token request before sending the request to the Confidential Space attestation service. This helps to prevent the relying party from requesting a token for a protected resource that it shouldn't have access to.
TOKEN_TYPE
: Required. The type of token to return. Choose one of the following types:OIDC
: These tokens are validated against a public key specified in thejwks_uri
field at the OIDC token validation endpoint. The public key rotates regularly.PKI
: These tokens are validated against a root certificate specified in theroot_ca_uri
field at the PKI token validation endpoint. You need to store this certificate yourself. The certificate rotates every 10 years.
Because long-expiry certificates are used instead of short-expiry public keys for token validation, your IP addresses aren't exposed to Google servers as often. This means PKI tokens offer higher privacy than OIDC tokens.
You can validate the fingerprint of the certificate with OpenSSL:
openssl x509 -fingerprint -in confidential_space_root.crt
The fingerprint should match the following SHA-1 digest:
B9:51:20:74:2C:24:E3:AA:34:04:2E:1C:3B:A3:AA:D2:8B:21:23:21
NONCE
: Optional. A unique, random, and opaque value, ensuring that a token can only be used once. The value is set by the relying party. Up to six nonces are allowed. Each nonce must be between 10 and 74 bytes, inclusive.When including a nonce, the relying party must verify that the nonces sent in the attestation token request are the same as the nonces in the returned token. If they are different, the relying party must reject the token.
Parse and validate attestation tokens
The following code samples in Go show how to validate attestation tokens.
OIDC attestation tokens
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
)
const (
socketPath = "/run/container_launcher/teeserver.sock"
expectedIssuer = "https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com"
wellKnownPath = "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
)
type jwksFile struct {
Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
}
type jwk struct {
N string `json:"n"` // "nMMTBwJ7H6Id8zUCZd-L7uoNyz9b7lvoyse9izD9l2rtOhWLWbiG-7pKeYJyHeEpilHP4KdQMfUo8JCwhd-OMW0be_XtEu3jXEFjuq2YnPSPFk326eTfENtUc6qJohyMnfKkcOcY_kTE11jM81-fsqtBKjO_KiSkcmAO4wJJb8pHOjue3JCP09ZANL1uN4TuxbM2ibcyf25ODt3WQn54SRQTV0wn098Y5VDU-dzyeKYBNfL14iP0LiXBRfHd4YtEaGV9SBUuVhXdhx1eF0efztCNNz0GSLS2AEPLQduVuFoUImP4s51YdO9TPeeQ3hI8aGpOdC0syxmZ7LsL0rHE1Q",
E string `json:"e"` // "AQAB" or 65537 as an int
Kid string `json:"kid"` // "1f12fa916c3a0ef585894b4b420ad17dc9d6cdf5",
// Unused fields:
// Alg string `json:"alg"` // "RS256",
// Kty string `json:"kty"` // "RSA",
// Use string `json:"use"` // "sig",
}
type wellKnown struct {
JwksURI string `json:"jwks_uri"` // "https://www.googleapis.com/service_accounts/v1/metadata/jwk/signer@confidentialspace-sign.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
// Unused fields:
// Iss string `json:"issuer"` // "https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com"
// Subject_types_supported string `json:"subject_types_supported"` // [ "public" ]
// Response_types_supported string `json:"response_types_supported"` // [ "id_token" ]
// Claims_supported string `json:"claims_supported"` // [ "sub", "aud", "exp", "iat", "iss", "jti", "nbf", "dbgstat", "eat_nonce", "google_service_accounts", "hwmodel", "oemid", "secboot", "submods", "swname", "swversion" ]
// Id_token_signing_alg_values_supported string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"` // [ "RS256" ]
// Scopes_supported string `json:"scopes_supported"` // [ "openid" ]
}
func getWellKnownFile() (wellKnown, error) {
httpClient := http.Client{}
resp, err := httpClient.Get(expectedIssuer + wellKnownPath)
if err != nil {
return wellKnown{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to get raw .well-known response: %w", err)
}
wellKnownJSON, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return wellKnown{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to read .well-known response: %w", err)
}
wk := wellKnown{}
json.Unmarshal(wellKnownJSON, &wk)
return wk, nil
}
func getJWKFile() (jwksFile, error) {
wk, err := getWellKnownFile()
if err != nil {
return jwksFile{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to get .well-known json: %w", err)
}
// Get JWK URI from .wellknown
uri := wk.JwksURI
fmt.Printf("jwks URI: %v\n", uri)
httpClient := http.Client{}
resp, err := httpClient.Get(uri)
if err != nil {
return jwksFile{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to get raw JWK response: %w", err)
}
jwkbytes, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return jwksFile{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to read JWK body: %w", err)
}
file := jwksFile{}
err = json.Unmarshal(jwkbytes, &file)
if err != nil {
return jwksFile{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshall JWK content: %w", err)
}
return file, nil
}
// N and E are 'base64urlUInt' encoded: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518#section-6.3
func base64urlUIntDecode(s string) (*big.Int, error) {
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
z := new(big.Int)
z.SetBytes(b)
return z, nil
}
func getRSAPublicKeyFromJWKsFile(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
keysfile, err := getJWKFile()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch the JWK file: %w", err)
}
// Multiple keys are present in this endpoint to allow for key rotation.
// This method finds the key that was used for signing to pass to the validator.
kid := t.Header["kid"]
for _, key := range keysfile.Keys {
if key.Kid != kid {
continue // Select the key used for signing
}
n, err := base64urlUIntDecode(key.N)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode key.N %w", err)
}
e, err := base64urlUIntDecode(key.E)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode key.E %w", err)
}
// The parser expects an rsa.PublicKey: https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/blob/main/rsa.go#L53
// or an array of keys. We chose to show passing a single key in this example as its possible
// not all validators accept multiple keys for validation.
return &rsa.PublicKey{
N: n,
E: int(e.Int64()),
}, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to find key with kid '%v' from well-known endpoint", kid)
}
func decodeAndValidateToken(tokenBytes []byte, keyFunc func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error)) (*jwt.Token, error) {
var err error
fmt.Println("Unmarshalling token and checking its validity...")
token, err := jwt.NewParser().Parse(string(tokenBytes), keyFunc)
fmt.Printf("Token valid: %v", token.Valid)
if token.Valid {
return token, nil
}
if ve, ok := err.(*jwt.ValidationError); ok {
if ve.Errors&jwt.ValidationErrorMalformed != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token format invalid. Please contact the Confidential Space team for assistance")
}
if ve.Errors&(jwt.ValidationErrorNotValidYet) != 0 {
// If device time is not synchronized with the Attestation Service you may need to account for that here.
return nil, errors.New("token is not active yet")
}
if ve.Errors&(jwt.ValidationErrorExpired) != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token is expired")
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown validation error: %v", err)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("couldn't handle this token or couldn't read a validation error: %v", err)
}
func main() {
// Get a token from a workload running in Confidential Space
tokenbytes, err := getTokenBytesFromWorkload()
// Write a method to return a public key from the well-known endpoint
keyFunc := getRSAPublicKeyFromJWKsFile
// Verify properties of the original Confidential Space workload that generated the attestation
// using the token claims.
token, err := decodeAndValidateToken(tokenbytes, keyFunc)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
claimsString, err := json.MarshalIndent(token.Claims, "", " ")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
fmt.Println(string(claimsString))
}
PKI attestation tokens
To validate the token, the relying party must complete the following steps:
Parse the header of the token to get the certificate chain.
Validate the certificate chain against the stored root. You must have previously downloaded the root certificate from the URL specified in the
root_ca_uri
field returned at the PKI token validation endpoint.Check the validity of the leaf certificate.
Use the leaf certificate to validate the token signature, using the algorithm specified in the
alg
key in the header.
After the token is validated, the relying party can then parse the claims of the token.
// This code is an example of how to validate a PKI token. This library is not an official library,
// nor is it endorsed by Google.
// ValidatePKIToken validates the PKI token returned from the attestation service is valid.
// Returns a valid jwt.Token or returns an error if invalid.
func ValidatePKIToken(storedRootCertificate x509.Certificate, attestationToken string) (jwt.Token, error) {
// IMPORTANT: The attestation token should be considered untrusted until the certificate chain and
// the signature is verified.
jwtHeaders, err := ExtractJWTHeaders(attestationToken)
if err != nil {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("ExtractJWTHeaders(token) returned error: %v", err)
}
if jwtHeaders["alg"] != "RS256" {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("ValidatePKIToken(string, *attestpb.Attestation, *v1mainpb.VerifyAttestationRequest) - got Alg: %v, want: %v", jwtHeaders["alg"], "RS256")
}
// Additional Check: Validate the ALG in the header matches the certificate SPKI.
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.7
// This is included in golangs jwt.Parse function
x5cHeaders := jwtHeaders["x5c"].([]any)
certificates, err := ExtractCertificatesFromX5CHeader(x5cHeaders)
if err != nil {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("ExtractCertificatesFromX5CHeader(x5cHeaders) returned error: %v", err)
}
// Verify the leaf certificate signature algorithm is an RSA key
if certificates.LeafCert.SignatureAlgorithm != x509.SHA256WithRSA {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("leaf certificate signature algorithm is not SHA256WithRSA")
}
// Verify the leaf certificate public key algorithm is RSA
if certificates.LeafCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("leaf certificate public key algorithm is not RSA")
}
// Verify the storedRootCertificate is the same as the root certificate returned in the token.
// storedRootCertificate is downloaded from the confidential computing well known endpoint
// https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com/.well-known/attestation-pki-root
err = CompareCertificates(storedRootCertificate, *certificates.RootCert)
if err != nil {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to verify certificate chain: %v", err)
}
err = VerifyCertificateChain(certificates)
if err != nil {
return jwt.Token{}, fmt.Errorf("VerifyCertificateChain(string, *attestpb.Attestation, *v1mainpb.VerifyAttestationRequest) - error verifying x5c chain: %v", err)
}
keyFunc := func(token *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
return certificates.LeafCert.PublicKey, nil
}
verifiedJWT, err := jwt.Parse(attestationToken, keyFunc)
return *verifiedJWT, err
}
// ExtractJWTHeaders parses the JWT and returns the headers.
func ExtractJWTHeaders(token string) (map[string]any, error) {
parser := &jwt.Parser{}
// The claims returned from the token are unverified at this point
// Do not use the claims until the algorithm, certificate chain verification and root certificate
// comparison is successful
unverifiedClaims := &jwt.MapClaims{}
parsedToken, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(token, unverifiedClaims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to parse claims token: %v", err)
}
return parsedToken.Header, nil
}
// PKICertificates contains the certificates extracted from the x5c header.
type PKICertificates struct {
LeafCert *x509.Certificate
IntermediateCert *x509.Certificate
RootCert *x509.Certificate
}
// ExtractCertificatesFromX5CHeader extracts the certificates from the given x5c header.
func ExtractCertificatesFromX5CHeader(x5cHeaders []any) (PKICertificates, error) {
if x5cHeaders == nil {
return PKICertificates{}, fmt.Errorf("VerifyAttestation(string, *attestpb.Attestation, *v1mainpb.VerifyAttestationRequest) - x5c header not set")
}
x5c := []string{}
for _, header := range x5cHeaders {
x5c = append(x5c, header.(string))
}
// The PKI token x5c header should have 3 certificates - leaf, intermediate and root
if len(x5c) != 3 {
return PKICertificates{}, fmt.Errorf("incorrect number of certificates in x5c header, expected 3 certificates, but got %v", len(x5c))
}
leafCert, err := DecodeAndParseDERCertificate(x5c[0])
if err != nil {
return PKICertificates{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse leaf certificate: %v", err)
}
intermediateCert, err := DecodeAndParseDERCertificate(x5c[1])
if err != nil {
return PKICertificates{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse intermediate certificate: %v", err)
}
rootCert, err := DecodeAndParseDERCertificate(x5c[2])
if err != nil {
return PKICertificates{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse root certificate: %v", err)
}
certificates := PKICertificates{
LeafCert: leafCert,
IntermediateCert: intermediateCert,
RootCert: rootCert,
}
return certificates, nil
}
// DecodeAndParseDERCertificate decodes the given DER certificate string and parses it into an x509 certificate.
func DecodeAndParseDERCertificate(certificate string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
bytes, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(certificate)
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse certificate: %v", err)
}
return cert, nil
}
// DecodeAndParsePEMCertificate decodes the given PEM certificate string and parses it into an x509 certificate.
func DecodeAndParsePEMCertificate(certificate string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(certificate))
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot decode certificate")
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse certificate: %v", err)
}
return cert, nil
}
// VerifyCertificateChain verifies the certificate chain from leaf to root.
// It also checks that all certificate lifetimes are valid.
func VerifyCertificateChain(certificates PKICertificates) error {
if isCertificateLifetimeValid(certificates.LeafCert) {
return fmt.Errorf("leaf certificate is not valid")
}
if isCertificateLifetimeValid(certificates.IntermediateCert) {
return fmt.Errorf("intermediate certificate is not valid")
}
interPool := x509.NewCertPool()
interPool.AddCert(certificates.IntermediateCert)
if isCertificateLifetimeValid(certificates.RootCert) {
return fmt.Errorf("root certificate is not valid")
}
rootPool := x509.NewCertPool()
rootPool.AddCert(certificates.RootCert)
_, err := certificates.LeafCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
Intermediates: interPool,
Roots: rootPool,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify certificate chain: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
func isCertificateLifetimeValid(certificate *x509.Certificate) bool {
currentTime := time.Now()
// check the current time is after the certificate NotBefore time
if !currentTime.After(certificate.NotBefore) {
return false
}
// check the current time is before the certificate NotAfter time
if currentTime.Before(certificate.NotAfter) {
return false
}
return true
}
// CompareCertificates compares two certificate fingerprints.
func CompareCertificates(cert1 x509.Certificate, cert2 x509.Certificate) error {
fingerprint1 := sha256.Sum256(cert1.Raw)
fingerprint2 := sha256.Sum256(cert2.Raw)
if fingerprint1 != fingerprint2 {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate fingerprint mismatch")
}
return nil
}