Verify the build provenance

Assured OSS packages are built with SLSA Level 2 compliance. Build provenance is provided as part of the security metadata. This page explains how to verify the build provenance metadata.

This document applies to the free tier. For information about the build provenance in the premium tier, see Access security metadata and verify packages.

Before you begin

Install cosign to verify the signature in the build provenance.

Set up authentication

For information about setting up authentication, see Set up authentication.

Verify build provenance

Build provenance is signed using an in-toto attestation which in turn uses dsse envelope format. This means that the generated signature contains the wrapped signature and the raw data.

Using the aoss-verifier tool

To verify build provenance, install the aoss-verifier tool.
Export $(go env GOPATH)/bin, and run the aoss-verifier verify-package command with the --verify_build_provenance flag.
```
aoss-verifier verify-package \
   --language LANGUAGE \
   --package_id PACKAGE_ID \
   --version VERSION \
   --artifact_path ARTIFACT_PATH \
   --verify_build_provenance \
   [--disable_certificate_verification] \
   [--temp_downloads_path TEMP_DOWNLOADS_DIR_PATH] \
   [--disable_deletes]
```
Replace the following:
- LANGUAGE: The package language. The value must be in lowercase.
- PACKAGE_ID: For Java, the format is groupId:artifactId. For Python, the format is packageName. The value must be in lowercase.
- VERSION: The version of the package.
- ARTIFACT_PATH: The path to the data file in your local directory that you want to verify. Use the following filename extensions:
  - jar file extension for a Java package
  - whl file extension for a Python package
--disable_certificate_verification is an optional flag which skips matching leaf certificate to the root certificate through the certificate chain, if used.

--temp_downloads_path is an optional flag to set the path where you want to download the files. Replace TEMP_DOWNLOADS_DIR_PATH. If this flag isn't set, the files are downloaded to the tmp_downloads folder in the current directory.

--disable_deletes is an optional flag which keeps the downloaded files. By default, the tool cleans all the downloaded files.

For more information, see the README file of the tool.

Manual verification

To verify the build provenance, do the following:

Retrieve build provenance.

Depending on how you access security metadata, the build provenance is accessed differently.

If you access security metadata using Cloud Storage, build provenance is available as part of the Build Information metadata under the buildDetails field.

For more information, see the following sample metadata snippet:

{
  "creationTime": "2023-03-25T05:32:23Z",
  "buildDetails": [
   {
     "packageFileName": "jackson-databind-2.13.3.jar",
     "envelope": {
     "payload": "eyJfdHlwZSI6Imh0d……………",
     "payloadType": "application/vnd.in-toto+json",
     "signatures": [
        "sig": "eyJwYXlsb2FkVHlwZSI6Im……",
        "keyid": "gcpkms://projects/cloud-aoss/locations/global/keyRings/cloud-aoss-ring/cryptoKeys/tekton-chains"
       }
     ]
   },
  "buildProvenance": "{\"_type\":\"https://in-toto.io/Statement/v0.1…"
.....

If you access security metadata using Artifact Analysis API, build provenance is stored in the BuildOccurrence section of the security metadata.

Sample metadata snippet:

{'BuildOccurrence': name: "projects/cloud-aoss/occurrences/06c514bb-1069-4cde-8d68-b1306f19535a"
resource_uri: "jackson-databind-2.13.3.jar@sha256:4c01a14673bc1cd4a2df337a3b4e695af0a6ed8ac6be19c9e4077377fb8adf92"
note_name: "projects/cloud-aoss/notes/tekton-cloudbuild-intoto"
kind: BUILD
create_time {
  seconds: 1665556616
  nanos: 891004000
}
……
……
}
envelope {
  payload: "{\"_type\":\"https://in-toto.io/Statement/v0.1\", ….."
  payload_type: "application/vnd.in-toto+json"
  signatures {
    sig: "{\"payloadType\":\"application/vnd.in-toto+json\",....."
    keyid: "gcpkms://projects/cloud-aoss/locations/global/keyRings/cloud-aoss-ring/cryptoKeys/tekton-chains"
  }
}
,
…

Retrieve the build provenance signature.

Build provenance contains a section named Envelope which contains signatures as EnvelopeSignature. To retrieve the signature, follow these steps:
1. Store the sig data in a file named signature.txt.
2. Check if the metadata is downloaded using the metadata script.
  
  If the metadata is downloaded using the metadata script, modify the signature and store it in another file called signature.sig.
  
  To modify the signature, run the following command:
```
cat signature.txt | sed -e 's/\\"/"/g' > signature.sig
```
  If the metadata is not downloaded using the metadata script, decode the signature and store it in another file called signature.sig.
  
  To decode the signature, use the following command:
```
cat signature.txt | tr '\-_' '+/' | base64 -d > signature.sig
```
Retrieve the build provenance public key.

The EnvelopeSignature section in build provenance contains the reference to the key that is used to sign the build provenance. The key is stored in one of the following formats:
1. gcpkms://projects/cloud-aoss/locations/global/keyRings/cloud-aoss-ring/cryptoKeys/KEY_NAME
2. gcpkms://projects/cloud-aoss/locations/global/keyRings/cloud-aoss-ring/cryptoKeys/KEY_NAME/cryptoKeyVersions/KEY_VERSION
  
  Where KEY_NAME and KEY_VERSION are the name and version of the Cloud Key Management Service key.
The public key is stored in a Cloud Storage bucket that is owned by Assured OSS.

Retrieve the public key using the Google Cloud CLI. Use one of the following commands:
- If only KEY_NAME is present:
```
gcloud storage cp gs://cloud-aoss/keys/KEY_NAME-public.pem PATH_TO_LOCAL_STORE
```
- If both KEY_NAME and KEY_VERSION are present:
```
gcloud storage cp gs://cloud-aoss/keys/KEY_NAME-KEY_VERSION-public.pem PATH_TO_LOCAL_STORE
```
Replace the following :
- KEY_NAME with the name of the Cloud Key Management Service key.
- KEY_VERSION with the version of the Cloud Key Management Service key.
- PATH_TO_LOCAL_STORE with the name of the local path for storing the public key.
Verify the provenance signature.
1. To verify the signature, run the following command:
```
cosign verify-blob-attestation --insecure-ignore-tlog --key KEY_REF --signature signature.sig --type slsaprovenance --check-claims=false /dev/null
```
  Replace the following:
  - KEY_REF: The path to the public key you downloaded in the previous step.
  - signature.sig: The file containing the signature retrieved in the previous step.
  The following output is returned after the command runs successfully:
  
  Verified OK
2. To also verify the artifact hash associated with the provenance, use the following command:
```
cosign verify-blob-attestation --insecure-ignore-tlog --key KEY_REF --signature signature.sig --type slsaprovenance --check-claims=true ARTIFACT_PATH 
```
  Replace the following:
  - KEY_REF: The path to the public key you downloaded in the previous step.
  - signature.sig: The file containing the signature retrieved in the previous step.
  - ARTIFACT_PATH: The path to the artifact.
  The following output is returned after the command runs successfully:
  
  Verified OK

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